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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STA-rE OF U TAl-I
:JIARY A. HARMAN,

Respondent,
v.s.
ALBERT YEAGER and MAY C.
YEAGER,
.Appellants.

No. 6244

RESPO·NDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF CASE
The appellants, on Noven1ber 18, 1932, conveyed to
respondent the following described parcel of land in Salt
Lake County, Utah : Beginning at a point 8.7 rods
(143.55 ft.) South of theN orthwest corner of Lot ~. Block
22, 10 acres Plat "A"~ Big· Yit>ld Survey, and running
thence North 4.35 rods (71.775 ft.); thence E.ast 46 rod~;
thence South 4.35 rods; thence \Vest 46 rods to place of

1
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beginning; being the South lh of the North 1;4 of said Lot
8, containing 11;4 acres more or less. By the same deed,
the appellants pretended to convey to respondent llJt
acres of stock of the Big Cottonwood Lower Canal Co.
Lot 8, above mentioned, was divided into four parts, each
46 rods East to West and 4.35 rods North to South; and
before the conveyance to the respondent, the appellant
owned the North quarter, and at the time of the commencement of this action, the defendants, other than the
Yeagers, owned the quarter lot South of what was originally the Yeager's quarter lot. 'rhere is no evidence as
to the origin of respondent's title to the land in the quarter lot south of her land except by negotiation with and
the stipulations of the owners of that quarter; but by her
complaint in this action she clain1ed, and by the judgment
herein was awarded, the strip of ground approximately
46 rods East to West, five feet deep at its West end and
eight feet deep at its East end, and which was contiguous to the South half of the North quarter of said Lot 8.
The respondent particularly desired to ascertain the
North boundary line of her property; and in her complaint described the South half of the North quarter of
Lot 8 together with the strip above mentioned as one
parcel. So far as the trial was concerned, and on this
appeal we shall treat the case as one against the Yeager's
to quiet title to the South half of the North quarter of
Lot 8, the parcel first above described as conveyed by
them to the respondent; and, in this regard , the complaint and appellant's answer described or included tlw
same land as conveyed by appellants to respondent.
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The complaint is in the usual forn1 of actions to quiet
title. In the appellants' answer after describing the land
emveyed by then1 to respondent, they alleg·e: "That dividing the property so conveyed (i. e., the South half· of
the North quarter of Lot 8) fro1n the property retained,
a fence had been constructed by the defendants, (appellants) and was standing at the time of conveyance above
mentioned and the said plaintiff had been in possession
of the property conveyed south of the .said fence and no
part of defendant's land had been in possession of said
plaintiff"; and, further, "that so far as any conflict
exists between property described above and within the
fence line as hereinabove deseribed, these defendants
deny t.~e allegations of said con1plaint and whole thereof,
and allege the plaintiff is not entitled to any part or portion of said north half or north half of north half of Lot
8, Block 22, 10 acre Plat 'A,' Big Field Survey, Salt
Lake City, Utah.'' The answer contains the prayer, that
''the plaintiff take nothing by her action so far as the
property described of defendants and that these defendants have their costs herein expended.''
'rhe substance of the foregoing allegation is, we presume, that there was a fence on the division line between
ti1e north half and south half of the north quarter of said
Lot 8; and that respondent ''Tas not entitled to any part
of the appellants' north half of that quarter. As the respondent was not clain1ing any part of the latter property, the allegations of the answer elucidated by the prayPr, contains a concession by appellants that respondent's
title to the south half of the north quarter of Lot 8 1night

3
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be quieted. Indeed, it would not be too strong a statement
to say, that the appellants joined in the prayer of respondent's complaint that her title to the latter property
be quieted.
The defendants named in the complaint, other than
the appellants disclaimed; and the action came on for
trial on the complaint and appellant's answer. While
plaintiff's counsel was making a statement of the case
to the court, a discussion arose between the court and the
attorneys, in which the Judge, addressing counsel for appellants, said: ''The plaintiff wants the land described
in the deed, no more, no less, and you say they are entitled to the land described in the- deed, no more and no
less" (Tr., 74); and, also, "I do not think you have a
controversy here" (Tr., 76). The appellant's counsel
thereupon asked leave to amend his answer, so as to claim
''three feet on one side and five feet on the other, north of
the fence described in the answer, and 24 hours in which
to prepare the amendment.'' ( Tr ., 77.) The court had
previously stated to plaintiff's counsel, "I will give you
judgment on your pleadings to that effect-that you
have the land described in the deed." (Tr., 76.) Plaintiff's counsel objected to the appellants' proposed amendment of their answer and the court thereupon said, "I
will entertain a motion for judgment on the pleadings
quieting title''; to which counsel for plaintiff replied,
"We make that motion, Your Honor." The court granted the motion, saying, ''The n1otion is for judgment of
the pleadings in favor of the p~aintiff and against the
defendants, Albert Yeager and May C. Yeager.'' (Tr.,
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78.) The court then addressed the attorney for the defendants, saying:'' Now, that does not bar you, Mr. Cluff.
You get your answer drawn and if you want to ask leave
to open the case or file your answer or not, as the case
may be, you can draw your answer that will give you a
cause of action." To which Mr. Cluff replied, "I will
see what I can do anyway." (Tr., 78.) The plaintiff then
asked for judgment on the answer and stipulation of fact
and subscribed by the plaintiff and remaining defendants,
settling the boundary line between the other properties ;
which motion the court granted. ( Tll' ., 78.)
On September 25, 1939, within the time allowed by the
court therefor, the appellants served and filed their
notice of intention to move for a new trial on all the1
statutory grounds, excepting to those relating to misconduct of the jury, etc., excessive damages and newly discovered evidence (Tr., 21); and also served and filed
what is denominated ''Motion to Vacate Decree and for
Permission to Amend Answer,'' but which really is only
a notice of intention to make a motion for that purpose
and specifying the grounds on which it would be made,
which were: ( 1) That no time was allo-vved defendants
to file objection to trial minutes as prepared by attorlleys for plaintiff as required in Rule 13 of Rules of
Practice of the District Court of the Third Judicial District; (2) that no time was allowed defendants to mnend
their answer after motion for judgment of the pleadings;
(3) that the decree is contrary to law; (4) that the denial in the answer is sufficient to raise an issue, and ( 5)
that the judgment is contrary to law and the court erred
5
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in judgment on the pleadings, since in making the motion
by plaintiff the court (should) have treated the denial as
sufficient and the case should have gone to trial and
plaintiff required to offer evidence in support of complaint. (Tr., 22.)
Both of the foregoing motions were, on October 14,
1939, with the consent of appellants, by their attorney,
denied. (Tr., 25, 104.)
On November 2, 1939, the appellants, by their present
attorney, Mr. Henroid, served a notice of motion that on
November 18, 1939, they would move the court to reconsider the motion to vacate decree and permission to
amend answer theretofore filed, upon the grounds therein .stated and also upon the grounds of: (Specifying all
the statutory grounds for motion for new trial, excepting
those related to misconduct of the jury, etc., and excessive damages. (Tr., 34.) Afterwards, on December 6,
1939, the appellants tendered an answer, in which they
alleged, in substance, that at the time of their conveyance to plaintiff, a fence stood on or near the north
boundary of Lot 8, and that there was another fence
separating the lot intended to be conveyed to plaintiff
and that intended to be retained by defendants; that
when defendants conveyed to plaintiff, it was the intention to measure the property by starting at the fence line
on or near the north boundary of Lot 8 and that the
plaintiff accepted the property on the south side of
second fence, above mentioned, which separated the lot
intended to be conveyed to plaintiff and that intended to
be retained by defendants; that the assumption of both
6
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plaintiff and defendant that the partition fence was to
be the true boundary line between the properties, and
that if said partition fence was not the true boundary,
it was treated as such by plaintiff and defendants, "and
if it were not the true boundary line there was a mutual
mistake''; that measured from any other line (that is,
the fence on or near the north boundary of Lot 8) di~
not and would not constitute the conveyance agreed upon
by plaintiff and defendants; the plaintiff and defendants at all times treated the fence and ditch as the south
boundary of plaintiff's property; that for more than 10
years the defendants have occupied and cultivated the
premises north of the partition fence, adverse to the defendant and all the world under claim of title based on
fence line and natural monuments, paying taxes thereon
for said 10 year.s and the defendants' possession during
said time has been open, notorious, uninterrupted and
peaceable under claim of right, u save and exce:pt as
qualified by the above entitled case"; that the partition
fence between plaintiff and defendants' properties was
at the time of conveyance the agreed boundary line separated the properties, and that said fence was then in place
and is now in place; that for many years the plaintiff
treated said partition fence as the true boundary line and
made no claim to any property north of .said partition
fence and represented to defendants and others that said
fence was the true boundary line; that defendants believed said representations and planted shrubs, cultivated
crops, and built structures thereon and plaintiff is
estopped from asserting any claim to the property north
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of said partition fence. The defendants also included
the following counterclairn in their answer:
That these defendants are the owners and occupants of all the property between said partition
fence and the fence on or near the north boundary
of Lot 8, Block 22, Plat ''A,'' Big Field Survey,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah; that the plaintiff
asserts to have some claim or interest in a part
thereof but the plaintiff's claim is without any right
whatsoever.
The defendants prayed that a judgment be entered in
their favor ''quieting their title to the property up to
the partition fence herein mentioned, and that a decree
be entered reforming the deed herein mentioned in paragraph 3, to conform to the intentions of the parties and
reforming the description in said deed," etc. (Tr., 47.)
The appellant, Albert Yeager, made an Affidavit in
support of so-called motion to vacate the decree, in which
he attempts to state grounds for the motion, as follows:
''There was an excusable misunderstanding concerning
the .starting point for the measurement of said properties"; "and that any stipulation of boundary was based
on miswnderstanding"; "that the Court's ruling was
based on mutual mistake and misunderstanding, on complete lack of sworn testimony and evidence, and constituted inadvertence and excusable neglect''; ''that affiant believes and states defendants have an affirmative
defense based on prescription and adverse possession
which affiant would have asserted but for said misunderstanding with respect to measuring points''; ''that
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the Court's g1vmg judg1nent on the pleadings constituted accident and surprise because of the misunderstanding"; "that affiant has newly discovered evidence"
(of three particulars) ; ''that there was insufficiency of
evidence to support judgment on the pleadings, there
having been no evidence introduced on behalf of either
plaintiff or defendants''; and ''that there was error in
law in granting motion for judgment on the pleadings
and refusing to grant defendants' n1otion for a new
trial.''

ARGUMENT
The appellants have filed an assignment of errors in
which they except to and assign as error (1) the Court's
overruling defendants' demurrer, (2) judgment on pleadings, (3) trial minutes signed by judge based on hearing September 16, 1939, ( 4) written decree quieting title
in plaintiff, ( 5) denial of defendants' motions to set aside
decree and permit amendment of answer, and denial of
motion for new trial, motion for new trial and motion to
vacate judgment, February 6, 1940, and (7) denial of
defendants' motion to amend answer, September 6, 1939,
and to all other orders (J;nd rulings of the court in said
cause, made and entered adverse to and objected to by
Albert Yeager a;nd May C. Yeager, defenda;nts. (Ahs.,
29.) If it is the rule that in the assignment of errors,
the errors complained of should be clearly designated,
the assignments numbered :2, 3, and 4, and most, if not all
of 5 and 7, are insufficient for the reason that they are
too general and indefinite; and as assignments num-
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bered 1 and 3 are not argued in appellants' brief, none
of these assignments of error is entitled to the consideration of the court. Blue Creek L. and L. S. Co. v. Anderson, 35 Utah 61, 99 P. 444; Crook v. Harman, 29 Utah
304, 81 P. 95; Thomas v. Perry Irr. Co., 63 Utah 490, 227
P. 225; Appeal on Falkenberg, 73 Utah 50, 272 P. 225.
In the first case above cited, and in the Falkenberg case,
it was held that in assigning as error the overruling of a
motion for a new trial, the grounds thereof as to which
it is claimed the court erred should be specified; and in
the other cases it was held that assignment of error
merely attaching the judgment cannot be considered. See,
also, Copeland v. Ferris, 118 Iowa 554, 92 N. W. 699;
Barry v. Barry, 9 Kan. App. 884, 59 P. 685; Ferrell v.
City of Opelika, 144 Ala. 135, 39 South, 289.
Originally, about September 25, 1939, the appellants
filed a motion to vacate the decree and for a new trial.
The former, owing to the grounds on which it is based, is
a nondescript thing; but we must presume that it was
made under Rev. Sts. 1933, 104-14-4, authorizing the court
to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or other proceeding taken against and through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable negl~ct. In King v. Superior
Court, 12 Cal. App. (2d) 501, 56 P. (2d) 268, it was held
that the ''ordinary ways in which judgment may be set
aside by court are by motion for new trial, by motion
made in due time under statutes, by motion at any time
when judgment is void on its face, and by suit in equity,
where judgment is regular in form but void for extrinsic
fraud or other proper cause.'' It has often puzzled courts
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as to how to classify a particular uwtion, as in Thomas v.
Morris, 8 Utah :28-1-, 31 P. -1--1-6; but, ordinarily, the ques.tion is, whether it is a motion for a new trial, and in this
case we cannot call the motion to vacate the decree a
motiDn for a new trial, for the reason that a formal motion for a new trial was filed at the same time. True,
Section 104-14-4 conten1plated, as was said in the Thomas
Case, a case where relief is applied for on grounds (Inistake, inadvertence, etc.,) differing rna terially from those
mentioned in section 104-40-:2, and that the defendants'
motion does not state such grounds, still we must classify
it as coming under the former section; although in the
absence of the motions for a new trial, the motion to
vacate the decree might have been treated as such. Newlander v. Rothschild, 67 Ill. App. 288. If the motion to
vacate comes under section 104-14-4, then it is without
grounds as it does not allege mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, for on a proper motion, the
ground alleged is the one question involved; and, further,
a meritorious defense must be shown by the answer tendered. Quealy v. Willardson, 35 Utah 414, 100 P. 930.
The original motions of the defendants were, with the
consent of their attorney, denied October 14, 1939, and
on November 2, thereafter, their new attorney, Mr. Henroid, gave notice that on November 16, he would n1ove the
court to reconsider the motion to vacate decree and for
permission to amend answer theretofore filed, upon the
ground therein stated, and also upon the grounds of irregularity in the proceedings of the court, accident and
surprise, newly discovered evidence, insufficiency of the
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evidence to justify the decision, and error of law occurring at the trial (Abs., 15) ; but defendants' attorney now
claims, and the record may show, that on November 18,
1939, he orally moved the court to reconsider motion for
new trial to vacate judgment and permission to amend
and also to set aside the judgment and for a new trial.
( Abs., 30.) At page 35 of his abstract and brief, however,
he says: ''This decree was entered on October 18, 1939,
and thereafter and on November 2nd, 1939, defendants
served and filed Notice of Motion, wherein they proposed
to move the court, on November 18, 1939, to reconsider
the motion to vacate decree and permission to amend
(Tr., 34), and they set forth all the statutory grounds
previously set forth in their former motions (Tr., 21 and
22), adding in 8aid Notice of Motion, however, an addi~
tional statutory ground, i. e., newly disc~vered evidence
material for the applicant, which could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered and produced at the
trial'' ; and, further, at page 36 of the abstract and
brief: "In support of the motions for which said notice
was served and filed, defendants tendered a verified answer and one of the appellants, Mr. Yeager, tendered his
affidavit in support of the motions, setting forth reasons
for having a trial on the merits." It is possible that
co~sel for defendants had discovered that the notice of
''intention to move for a new trial stands for the formal
motion, and the questions may be ruled on., although no
motion is filed." East v. Moore, 7 Utah 414, '27 P. 4;
Lund v. Third Judicial District Court, 90 Utah 433, 62
P. (2d) 278, 282.
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At the hearing of the latter nwtions, the appellants'
attorney was confident of his right to ask reconsideration of the previous 1notions to vacate the decree and for
a new trial, and that he could file a second motion for a
new trial, with the right to support all of such motions
by oral and other evidence. The term ''reconsider''
chosen by appellants for their motions manifestly includes both the rehearing and renewal of motions. ( 42
C. J ., 520, Sec. 181.) There are distinctions between a
rehearing and the renewal of a motion, one of which is,
as stated in 42 C. J., 514, Sec. 161, that a rehearing "is
not an independent proceeding; but is always to be heard
on the same notice and the same papers upon which the
original motion was heard.'' Judge Straup recognized
this distinction in Luke v. Colen1an, 38 Utah 383, 113 P.
1023, when he said: ''The plaintiff, however, did not proceed on the theory of a second application based on new
grounds, but on the theory of a rehearing and a resubmission of the grounds already passed upon and adjudged on the first application." As to the renewal of a
motion, it has been said: "The necessity for obtaining
leave to renew a motion depends on the reasons for
which the renewal is sought, usually whether the renewal
motion is based on the same or on a new state of facts,~
. . . Want of leave to renew a motion in a case where
leave is necessary is a sufficient ground for denying this
renewal motion and it has been held to be reversible error
to grant such a motion but if the order is granted it is
not void, because the rule requiring leave to renew is
merely one of practice and may be disregarded by the
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court." 42 C. J. 518, Sec. 176. And in the same text,
page 719, Sec. 177, it is said: "Notwithstanding the decision of a motion may not operate strictly as res judicata,
it will ordinarily be considered as conclusive to the extent of barring this renewal of the same or a similar
motion once denied on the merits based on the same or
similar facts, either before the same or before a different judge unless leave of court is obtained to present the
same matter again, the renewal of .such a motion being
not of right but merely a matter of grace which as repeatedly said, should be 'rarely' or 'sparingly' granted."
Also, ''such a second motion should not be allowed where
it would result in permitting a party to bring forward his
objections by installments, without any excuse foc not
presenting all his objections upon the former motion"
(Sec. 183); for, in such a case the decision or order is
res judicata. Van Fleet's former adjudication, 102, Sec.
19; Rogers v. McCord-Collins Mere. Co., 19 Okla. 115,
91 P. 864; Winstone v. Winstone, 40 Wash. 272, 82 P.
268; Bernard v. Idaho Bank, Etc. Co., 21 Idaho 598, 123
P. 481; Ann. Cas. 1913E. 120; Harper v. Hildreth, 99 Cal.
265, 33 P. 1103; King v. Pony Gold Min. Co., 24 Mont.
470, 62 P. 783.
In appellants' brief, pages 43-48, their attorney lamely argues that the party aggrieved by the court's decision on a motion may thereafter make motions for rehearing or file new motions of the same character, provided
he presents additional grounds or new evidence, citing
Luke v. Coleman, 38 Utah 383, 113 P. 1023, and Lund v.
Third Judicial District Court, 90 Utah 433, 62 P. (2d)
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27S. It is hard to ~t>l' how these cases can be distorted to
fit that contention. In the Lund case, all previous Utah
eases, including Luke Y. Coleman, were reviewed and the
court held, (1) that "but one motion upon the statutory
grounds for a new trial rna~· be n1ade in pursuance of the
statute providing for motion for new trial," and (2) that
·'a motion for new trial may not after the time for filing
a motion for new trial has expired (section 104-40-4) be
amended by adding thereto a new or additional ground
not specified in the original motion but included in the
.~Tounds ~pecified in section 104-40-2 ''; and the court
stated, that in Luke v. Colen1an "the court held that a
rehearing of a motion for a new trial was a proceeding
unknown to our practice and that the trial court had no
power to reopen the question of granting or denying a
motion for a new trial after disposing of it.'' The proceeding in question in the Lund case was not a new or
amended n1otion for a new trial, but a motion to set aside
a judgment under Section 104-14-4, which provides, that
"\Vhen, for any reason, satisfactory to the court or judge
thereof, the party aggrieved has failed to apply for a
new trial or other relief sought during the term at which
Rnch judgment, order or proceeding complained of was
taken, the court, or judge thereof in vacation, may grant
the relief upon application made within a reasonable
time, not exceeding six months after the 1naking or occurrence of the judg1nent, order or other proceeding
soug-ht to be relieved from"; and the court, ,,·ith that
prO\·isiou in mind, said:
The party applying for relief under that section
mu::;t do 1nore than merely nwve the court to act and
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file the necessary affidavits required to be filed
in support of the motion for a new trial, as provided
for by .section 104-40-4, Supra. The applicant must
produce proper evidence upon which the court can
base findings, that through no fault of his he was
prevented from filing n notice of motion for a new
trial within the time fixed by the statute and produce satisfactory evidence why he did not apply for
an extension of time at some time within the statutory limitation.
We contend, however, that the court's action in granting judgm'ent on the pleadings in the present case cannot
be assigned as ground for a new trial, as it is not an
error of law occurring during the progress of the trial.
It was so held in Powder River Cattle Co. v. Custer
County Com 'rs, 9 Mont. 145, 22 P. 383, and in Ayotte v.
Nadeau, 32 Mont. 498, 81 P. 145. The court's granting
a motion for judgment prevents a trial, and a motion for
a new trial is only proper where there has been a trial.
Thomas v. Morris, 8 Utah 284, 31 P. 446. The statute,
section 104-40-1, provides tiiat "a new trial" is a reexamination of an issue of fact in the same court after
a trial and decision by a jury, court, judicial officer or
referee." In Stockton Iron \Yorks v. Walter, 18 Cal.
App. 373, 123 U. 240, it was held that "trial" as used in
Cal. Code Civ. Prac. Sec. 656, declaring that a new trial
is a re-examination of an issue of fact by the same court ·
after a trial and decision by jury or court, refers to an
investigation of the issues of fact raised by the pleadings.'' And see, People v. Bank, 15:2 Cal. ~Gl, 9:2 P. 481.
Buckhouse v. Parsons, 60 Mont. 156, 198 P. 444. A staternent in James v. Robertson, 39 Utah 414, 117 P. 1068,
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wherein Judge Frick said that "a party had the unqualified right to move for a IH'w trial in e\·ery case,''
might be misleading; but the cases cited by this judge
show that he meant after a trial. In Cella v. Chicago and
\Y. I. R. Co., ~17 Ill. 326, 75 N. E·. 373, it was held that
errors regarding motions upon pleadings, or other matters arising before the trial is entered upon, are not
ground for motion for a new trial, adding that suc:b
motion only reaches errors occurring during the course
of the trial. In Abbey Land & Improvement Co. v. San
Mateo County, 167 Cal. 434, 139 P. 1068, 52 L. R. (N. S.)
408, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 804, it was held that a motion for
new trial cannot be entertained where the cause was submitted on the pleadings. In Beach v. Spokane Ranch &
Water Co., 21 :Mont. 7, 5:2 P. 560, it was held that a motion which does not ask for a decision on an issue of
fact arising on the pleadings is not the subject of a new
trial. A motion for a new trial is not a proper proceeding to review the action of the court in giving judgment,
where no issue of fact was tried (Younger v. Moore, 8
Cal. App. 237, 96 P. 1093) and, for this reason, the trial
court's rulings on demurrers to and motions respecting
pleadings are not proper grounds for new trial. Gray v.
James, 100 Ind. App. 257, 194 N. E. 203; Bone v. Hayes,
134 CaL 759, 99 P. 17:2; Perkins v. McDowell, 3 Wyo. 328,
23 P. 71. The last four paragraphs of :Mr. Yeager's affidavit (Abs., 28) show the absurdity of attempting to
·apply the grounds of motion for a new trial to a case
which was decided on a motion for judgment on the pleadings for lack of issue.
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The answer did not deny the allegations, even argumentatively, as by alleging title in the appellants; the
answer admitted the conveyance by appellants to respondent of the South lh of the North ~4 of Lot 8, describing it by metes and bounds, and alleged that dividing that parcel from the North half of the lot was a fence,
meaning, of course, that the fence extended west to east
through the middle of said north 1,4, and alleged that so
far as any conflict exists between the property conveyed to respondent and within the fence line, the appellants denied the allegations of the complaint. If the
fence was in the middle of said north quarter, right on
the north boundary line of the land sold to respondent,
it is hard to see how "any conflict exists between property described above and within the fence line as hereinabove described.'' Whatever that may mean. According to the answer, there was no disputed area. The
proposed amended answer contained many statements
a.s to the intentions and &ssumptions of the parties regarding the true north boundary line of the parcel of
land conveyed by appellants to respondent, and they
audaciously allege that the respondent "represented" to
appellants her vendors, that the fence was "on or near"
the median line, east to west of the north quarter of Lot
8; and although a reformation of the appellants' deed to
respondent is asked, there is no allegation as to what the
agreement between thmn was. While the amended answer indicates that appellants do not yet know that
there is an area between the fence m,entioned athl tlw
north boundary line given in their deed to respondent,
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they claim title to it by adverse possession, and as that
this title be quieted, although appellants conveyed to respondent November 18, 1932. In this case, the answer
does not show title by adverse possession; nor does it
show estoppel. Neither does the an1ended answer show
that the North boundary line of plaintiff's land was disputed or unknown. It may be that the appellants, or
one of them, stated that the fence on or near the north
boundary line of respondent's parcel was the true dividing line between their lands; although appellants do not
make such contention, but such a statement, although respondents appeared to accept it, would not bind either
of the parties. DeLong v. Baldwin, 111 Mich. 466, 69 N.
W. 831; Clapp v. Churchill, 164 Cal. 741, 130 P. 1061;
Hall v. Davis, 122 Ga. 252, 50 S. E. 106; Crawford v.
Roloson, 256 Mass. 331, 152 N. E. 319; Cornell v. Jackson, 9 Met. (lviass.) 150; Trussel v. Lewis, 13 Neb. 415,
14 N. 'N. 155, 42 Am. Rep. 767; Cummings v. Williams
(Tex. Civ. App.) 260 S. W. 845; Purtle v. Bell, 225 Ill.
5~3, 80 N. E. 350; Sonnemann v. Mertz, 221 Ill. 362, 77 N.
E. 550; McAfferty v. Conover, 70 Ohio St. 99, 70 Am.
Dec. 57; Mcl{inney v. Doane, 155 Mo. 287, 59 S. W. 304;
Hatfield v. Workman, 35 vV. Va. 586, 14 S. E. 153;
Miner v. New York, 5 Jones & S. (N.Y.) 171; Bemis v
Bradley, 126 Me. 462, 139 A. 593, 69 A. L. R. 1399. The
above eases are reviewed in 69 A. L. R. at pages 1449,
1452, 1455, 1478, 1487, 1488, 1489, of the annotation. At
pagP 1481 of that annotation quoting from Davison v.
l~idwnl~ ('rex. CiY. App.) 38 S. \V. 374, it is said: "The
mere statement that the line is at a particular place does
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not, of itself, constitute an agreement that it shall be
there, or bind the parties when the error of the statement
is discovered''; and at page 1487 of the annotation, quoting 4 R. C. L. 131, it is said: "It has been held that an
agreement fixing a boundary line under the belief that it
is the true boundary line when in fact it is not, is not
binding, and may be set aside by either party when the
mistake is discovered, unless there is some estoppel
which prevents it, as where the right of innocent third
persons has intervened. See, also, Tripp v. Bagley, 74
Utah 57, 276 P. 912, 69 A. L. R. 1417. A purchaser is
entitled to the land up to the lines called for in his deed, no
more, no less, unless as in Binford v. Eccles, 41 Utah 457,
126 P. 333, and Hill v. Schumacher, 45 Cal. App. 362,
187 P. 437, there is a surplus of land.
The question of pleading, in a case of this character,
seems to be well settled in Utah. Warren v. Mazzuchi,
45 Utah 612, 148 P. 360; Blackham v. Olsen, 51 Utah
124, 169 P. 156; Bartholomew v. Richett, 51 Utah 312,
170 P. 65; Nelson v. Da Rouch, 87 Utah 468, 50 P. (2d)
273. In the latter case, the court held : ''Locating of
building or fence or other structure that may later take
on nature of mo1;1ument in absence of, or without knowledge of, adjoining owner, or upon supposition that such
location is true boundary line when in fact it is not, and
when no express agreement or long acquiescence is shown
does not establish boundary line different from true
one'' ; and evidence as to long acquiescence in practical
boundary line consisting of trees and fences was held
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insufficient to overturn true boundary line as. established
by muniments of title.
On the occasion when the motion for judg1nent on
the pleadings was granted, appellants' attorney asked
leave to file an amendment to the complaint so as to
claim ''three feet on one side and five feet on the other,''
which obviously, is the equivalent of the strip apparently
claimed by respondent in the parcel south of the land
purchased from appellants. Although this may have been
a specious claim, the court refused to accede to that
bare request but clearly stated that if the appellants
asked to reopen the case and tendered a proper answer,
the motion ·would be granted. The appellants, by a
peculiar motion, asked to reopen the case, but did not
tender an amended answer; and subsequently consented
that the motion might be denied. Under these circumstances, the appellants cannot c-omplain that they were
not given an opportunity to amend by making an issue
of some kind. We believe courts should be liberal in
allowing an1endments to a complaint in the face of a
motion for judgment on the pleadings. Perhaps the respondent, under her general allegation of title, would
not have been permitted to prove the establishment of the
south boundary line of her land by acquiescence or
agreement if it trenched upon the land of her neighbors
to the south. However, if the latter thoughtlessly disclaimed any interest in this strip and consented that a
decree might be entered in favor of the respondent, we
do not see why the appellants should profit b~· the mistake and concession, which has .since spoiled a sale of the
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parcel of land to the south. The last statement is outside
the record, as is the following: That respondent never
claimed any right there except that conveyed to her by
appellants, and so advised her counsel; but at their insistence, the strip in question remained a part of the subject matter of the complaint and was included in the
judgment. So far as respondent is concerned, it will be
restored to the rightful owners.

vVe

believe the record does not disclose any of the
Prrors assigned and that judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

PARLEY P. JENSON,
Attorney for Re8pnudruf.
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